destruction witnessed over the past decade, new studies of ethnic and religious violence now provide a theoretical basis for reexamining such violence in comparative perspective. 4 The articles in this issue represent a new wave of Atlantic world scholarship attempting to place violence at the center of the Columbian Exchange. 5 The studies here focus on violence in the early modern Atlantic world-considered as a space with particular, though not entirely unique, cross-cultural interactions at the beginning of the period of true globalization. 6 During the sixteenth century, the triangular transatlantic trading connections that increasingly linked Europe, Africa, and the Americas began to forge hybrid Atlantic cultures. 7 Although the Atlantic world was created by European navigation and maritime connections that broke down the preexisting isolation of various societies ringing the great ocean, "the birth of an Atlantic world also involved a gigantic international migration of people," that should be seen neither as Eurocentric nor as peaceful. ple, as an area in which "war and the frontier advanced together." 9 Recent borderlands studies offer new ways of considering intercultural violence and avoid casting violence as a mere by-product of disciplining discourse. Anthropologists R. Brian Ferguson and Neil L. Whitehead have theorized the "violent edge of empire" as a dynamic space of ethnic conflict and social reorganization. "That area continuously affected by the proximity of a state, but not under state administration, we call the 'tribal zone,'" they explain. "Within the tribal zone, the wider consequence of the presence of the state is the radical transformation of extant sociopolitical formations, often resulting in 'tribalization,' the genesis of new tribes." 10 Ferguson and Whitehead's useful conceptualization of borderlands as "tribal zones" allows a rethinking of ethnicity and conflict in the Atlantic world, especially if we inject religious violence into their model.
The authors in this issue offer cultural history reinterpretations of classic sources for borderlands studies and Atlantic world history. European travel narratives and cosmographical studies trace the broad outlines of the early modern Atlantic world, highlighting marvelous sights and monstrous creatures encountered by voyagers sailing the Atlantic Ocean or merely rumored by the people with whom they came into contact.
11 Such sources often sketch in few details of the peoples living along the Atlantic coast, but colonial chronicles and captivity narratives provide rich descriptions of prolonged interactions between Europeans, Native Americans, and Africans in the Atlantic world.
12 These sources offer details of cultural forms, behavior, and rituals. Inquisition records and missionary accounts delve into both colonial settlers' and indigenous peoples' religious beliefs and practices, allowing historians 12 I will use the term "Native American" to refer to all indigenous Americans throughout this text, recognizing that some scholars prefer the terms "American Indian," "Indian," or "Amerindian". For a discussion of the problems of Native American terminology and historiography, see R. David Edmunds, "Native Americans, New Voices: American Indian History, 1895-1995," American Historical Review 100 (June 1995): 717-740.
to explore direct connections between religion and violence. Almost all of these texts are Eurocentric accounts that rely on linguistic interpretation for their depictions of Native American and African cultures, making it difficult, if not impossible, to access indigenous peoples' voices. 13 The sixteenth-and seventeenth-century audiences for accounts of the Atlantic world were primarily European elites with strong political and religious agendas that probably framed the authors' approaches to their subjects. These fascinating texts, and the processes of their production, thus present complex problems of interpretation for historians attempting to tease out issues of religion, ethnicity, and violence in the early modern Atlantic world.
Obviously, the literature on ethnicity, religion, and violence in the early modern Atlantic world is too large to address comprehensively here; however, a comparative history of organized religious and ethnic violence in the Atlantic world becomes possible by focusing on the actualization of violence. In their work on violence and subjectivity, Veena Das and Arthur Kleinman emphasize examining "the processes through which violence is actualized-in the sense that it is both produced and consumed."
14 All three of the authors in this issue attempt to deal precisely with the production of religious and ethnic violence by treating early modern Spanish, Native American, and English practitioners of violence as key historical actors operating through overlapping subject positions. This approach to violence fundamentally questions Michel Foucault's influential portrayal of violence as the inscription of power/knowledge. 15 I will attempt to draw out some common themes from the three articles by situating them in relationship to recent research on ethnic and religious violence, then by discussing the contexts of captivity and atrocity that framed so much violence in the early modern Atlantic world. Within the borderlands, individuals' identities seem to have been incredibly flexible and changeable. Studies of ethnicity and violence in the Atlantic world often oppose "colonizers" to "indigenous peoples," envisioning a statist imperial program suppressing resistance by the colonized. Yet, the importance of nonstate actors in early modern Atlantic world ethnic violence makes such a focus on states extremely problematic. Conquistadors, military adventurers, and privateers may have acted vaguely in the name of European states, but they also had their personal motivations and programs. Many European travelers, traders, fur trappers, merchants, and castaways were able to construct supple "chameleon" identities, as Hans Staden's identity performances demonstrate. 21 Runaway slaves, castaways, and maroons could integrate into new communities. Borderlands also allowed people to discard unwanted identities, whether robber, cheat, rapist, or murderer.
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Native American societies' loose affiliations and permeability allowed flexible identifications, even when the proximity of European colonies prompted a more structured "tribalization." Native American war bands freely formed and re-formed around leaders. The identifications presented by individuals could be challenged and transformed through contact and conflict, and perhaps the most important factor in limiting or fixing ethnic identifications was violence.
Ethnic identification was often structured through language, but imperfectly. Communication between Native Americans and Europeans required linguistic translation and cultural explanation, as Tzvetan Todorov's provocative and fiercely debated work on interpretation 19 and linguistic conquest suggests. 23 Interpreters such as Malinche, who served as Hernán Cortés's personal translator, had peculiar positions and could wield substantial power in the borderlands, where intercultural miscommunications and misunderstandings were routine. H. E. Martel suggests that in this context, Native American groups used cultural interpretive strategies to address the threat posed by the arrival of European colonists. Rumors, insinuations, and legends could be weapons used to defend against European incursions, at least for a time. Interpreters occupied ambiguous positions despite the vital importance of intercultural communication. On this point, Melanie Perrault cites the example of the violent abduction of several Native Americans by English explorers to serve as their informants. If Europeans were dissatisfied with the information supplied by such informants, they could apply brutal violence, as when English colonial leader John Smith whipped a Native American guide for supposedly misleading him. Such evidence fits well with Alfred Cave's research on the origins of the Pequot War, which shows that miscommunications and ethnic responses could also result in escalating violence and disastrous warfare.
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Where Native American and European colonial communities lived in close proximity in borderlands, blurred cross-cultural identities and mixed-ethnic populations emerged. English colonial writings reflected their authors' conflicting impressions of Native American relations with early English colonies and the possibilities of assimilation of "noble savages" into a "civilized" transplanted English society. 25 Widespread evidence reveals communication, trading relations, cultural exchanges, and intermarriage between Native Americans and Europeans throughout the Americas. Negotiations, political alliances, and military cooperation between groups of Europeans and Native Americans provide more examples of constructive intercultural relations that broke down barriers, or at least allowed passages across them. In many colonial areas, different European ethnic groups mixed, further destabilizing identities. European settlement colonies promoted a "civilizing mission" that often challenged these cross-cultural identities, expecting conformity instead. Melanie Perrault's reading of English travel narratives and settlement histories highlights the ironic vision of harmony promoted by early English colonists in Virginia and New England, as they envisioned a patriarchal dominion over subordinated, domesticated "noble savage" dependents.
The possibilities of harmony and assimilation often ran afoul of Europeans' ethnic identifications, which defined their "civilized" societies in opposition to "barbarous" ones precisely by depicting "savages" as engaging in brutal, as opposed to legitimate, violence.
26 Ethnic identities, then, were also conceptualized and distinguished through the violent practices of warfare. The predominant analytical framework for understanding Native American forms of warfare until recently has been the theory of "primitive war," which portrays "primitive" societies as waging a form of warfare that was irrational and fundamentally different from "real," supposedly "civilized", warfare that was fought for rational political goals. 27 Recent studies argue that nonurbanized societies' forms of warfare were influenced by ethnic identities and culture in much more subtle ways. Lawrence H. Keely heavily criticizes the concept of "primitive war," showing how the notion perpetuates the stereotype of the "savages" as obeying a different "uncivilized" set of rules of war, yet somehow being "peaceful" by practicing a "more stylized, less horrible form of warfare than their civilized counterparts waged."
28 Studies of the "skulking" way of war and Native American fortifications have shown the flexibility and adaptability of Native American warfare, suggesting that notions and practices of violence could change as ethnic identification shifted. 29 Extended contact between Native Americans and European settlers in North America during the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 26 For a consideration of the later eighteenth-century development of these notions, see Karen Halttunen, "Humanitarianism and the Pornography of Pain in Anglo-American Culture," American Historical Review 100 (April 1995): 303-334. 27 The concept of "primitive war" stems principally from two key theoretical works originally published in the 1940s: Harry Holbert Turney-High, allowed technology transfers and acculturation to gradually reshape both Native American and European colonial practices of warfare. Europeans and Native Americans certainly had differing cultural expectations about the practice of warfare, yet accommodation and cultural adaptation were at times possible. 30 In certain aspects of warfare, blurred ethnic identities could emerge. For example, many Native Americans acted as "ethnic soldiers," providing auxiliary, mercenary, logistical, and reconnaissance services for European colonial military forces. 31 The diffusion of European diseases, firearms, and animals forced Native Americans to adapt to increasingly deadly warfare. At the same time, European territorial encroachments and colonial economic priorities-especially fur trading and silver mining-intensified warfare among Native American societies.
32 Native Americans progressively adopted firearms and certain European military techniques but maintained their "skulking" way of war, as the English described the stealth and ambush tactics employed by indigenous warriors. During King Philip's War, "the Indian mode of warfare, actually a blend of aboriginal and European elements, proved so successful in numerous engagements that perceptive officers and government officials began to urge changes in colonial military doctrine," according to Patrick M. Malone. 33 European coastal fortifications, trading factories, and military incursions forced social reorganizations and militarized Native American culture in the "tribal zone."
Ethnic identifications were also defined by racial conceptions that justified violence. Slave labor provided logistical support for European colonial and military operations in the Atlantic world. Native Americans were enslaved in the growing Spanish encomienda system, forced to work in agricultural operations and silver mines in Central and South America. From the beginning of European imperialism in the Atlantic, enslaved Africans played a role in colonial expansion 30 The ethnic violence discussed in this issue needs to be understood in conjunction with the contemporaneous gradual development of the plantation complex, an organization using slave labor and brutal violence to produce an agricultural cash crop for export. 35 
36 Eltis's point is supported by the example of the Irish on Montserrat, who initially came to the island as indentured servants to work on tobacco plantations and gradually became "hard and efficient slave masters," overseeing African slaves. 37 The plantations seem to have produced their own forms of violence, involving racist attitudes and the physical domination of Africans. Slave masters employed rape as a sexual weapon and established "breeder women" to perpetuate the slave population. European planters' racial fears prompted them to use brutal discipline, harsh punishments, and bodily mutilation implemented by dedicated overseers, who played significant roles in a plantation complex that was also sustained by religious values and beliefs.
Religious Transformation and Violence
Religion played an important role in shaping the Atlantic world from its inception, as extensive religious changes transformed religious beliefs and practices in the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. R. Scott Appleby's analysis of the ambiguous nature of religious militancy, coupled with his distinction between religious extremists and fundamentalists, suggests that we consider a broad range of actors participating directly in diverse religious movements and accompanying violent causes in this period. 38 Crusading ideologies, religious prophesies, and the Mediterranean struggle between Islam and Christianity clearly motivated Christopher Columbus and his patrons. 39 A series of piety movements and religious reformations then swept through Europe, destroying the unity of Latin Christianity through religious conflicts and a gradual process of "confessionalization." At the same time, early European imperialism in the Americas and the epidemic diseases that accompanied colonists devastated Native American societies and destabilized their religious systems.
In central Mexico, however, the swift collapse of the Aztec empire did not bring a sudden end to Mesoamerican religious beliefs and practice. Instead, social and demographic crises prompted religious experimentation and syncretic fusions of Christian and Mesoamerican religions. Religious groupings in mid-sixteenth-century Mexico were fluid and decentralized, allowing shamans to promote various religious interpretations of the catastrophic violence that destroyed the Aztec empire. Martin Ocelotl, the shaman studied by Patricia Lopes Don, seems to have freely drawn from Christian and Mesoamerican sources for his prophesies, mixing political resistance and religious creativity. Don's methodological approach to the Ocelotl case shares much with studies of the "religions of the oppressed" that have recast religious 38 Appleby, Ambivalence of the Sacred, pp. 8-15, 81-120. nonconformists and heretics as members of movements combining piety practices with the advancement of social interests. 40 Patricia Lopes Don sees Christian missionaries as both proponents and enactors of religious violence. The Indian Inquisition of the midsixteenth century shows that Spanish missionaries often seem to have been more concerned with establishing "correct" religion and disciplining new Christians than with winning new converts. During the sixteenth century, Franciscan, Dominican, and later Jesuit missionaries fanned out across Spanish and Portuguese territories in Central and South America, promoting an increasingly militant Catholicism. With the papacy embattled in Europe, the threat of idolatry, blasphemy, and polygamy in New Spain could seem frightening to these missionaries. The Indian Inquisition officials who attempted to deal with these issues faced a dilemma concerning whether indigenous Americans should be treated like Jews or Muslims-two groups whose ethnic and religious identities had long been considered problematic in Spanish culture. Interestingly, Spanish Inquisition officials operating on the other side of the Atlantic seem to have been just as concerned about "the threat of religious enthusiasm," as the case against Eugenia de la Torre in Madrid shows. 41 Spanish missionary efforts demanded such discipline because of the paternalism that underlay most contemporary Christian attitudes toward Native Americans. Early modern Christian missionaries generally believed that they were acting to bring the "true faith" to childlike Native Americans who were paradoxically close to Eden. 42 In the borderlands of the Atlantic world, Catholic missionaries soon competed over who would care for the souls of Native American "children" with Protestant evangelists, such as the Huguenots who were attempting to establish Calvinism in South America. English colonial expansion began slowly, but Protestant missionaries increasingly aimed to create "Praying Indians" in New England. 43 Both Protestant and Catholic colonists recognized that Christian Native Americans might be more likely to support European colonial governments or seek accommodation with settlers during periods of warfare. 44 Although some pragmatic goals certainly motivated missionary activity, religious concerns for proselytism predominated. Conversion processes were hotly debated during the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, and only a public profession of a "conversion experience" would be accepted as sincere. 45 Missionaries operating in the borderlands often saw themselves as caught up in a great religious struggle, and they assessed Native Americans' religiosity according to their experiences with other non-Europeans. The missionary activity in New Spain coincided with other Catholic campaigns to convert heretics in Europe and to bring the "true faith" to "savages" in the Americas, Africa, the Indian Ocean, and Japan. 46 "From the perspective of the French Franciscans," Megan C. Armstrong suggests, "the Wars of Religion was one of several fronts in their global war on sin, a war that embraced the rise of an aggressive form of Islamic rule in the East and encounters with New World peoples as well as the spread of Protestantism in Europe."
47 These missionaries were not alone in conceiving of religion in terms of struggle.
Contemporary Christian laypeople who experienced the broad 43 Johnson, "Search for a Usable Indian," pp. religious transformations in the early modern Atlantic world often espoused eschatological visions, perceiving of their world as a "world turned upside-down." Imagery portraying the symbolic inversion of worldly order was integral to Reformation-era propaganda and to widespread belief in the Antichrist and the impending Apocalypse. Many sixteenth-and early seventeenth-century Christians believed that the unsettling "discoveries" of the Americas, the religious discord within Europe, and other portents signaled that the "Last Days" were near. 48 While Protestants and Catholics had different ways of understanding God's power and human free will, almost all Europeans interpreted portents as evidence of Providence actively shaping the world around them.
European soldiers, clergy, and settlers all saw God's agency at work in their Atlantic colonies. 49 Millenarian beliefs implied that colonists represented instruments in a divine plan and participants in a "cosmic war," to use Mark Juergensmeyer's terminology, that involved "martyrs" in the struggle against "demons."
50 English colonists in Virginia, as Melanie Perrault points out, could genuinely believe that they were fighting "the Lord's battles," and many of their European contemporaries reported visions of cosmic battles in the heavens. 51 H. E. Martel rightly places Hans Staden into the context of a religious iconography of martyrdom and sacrifice. Early modern imperial ideologies incorporated religious commitment, fusing colonial expansionism with engagement in "cosmic war." An early seventeenth-century pamphlet celebrating the duc de Montmorency's appointment as admiral of France linked his readiness to fight the "galleys of Mohammed" with his preparedness "to search for new kingdoms for his master, to found new Frances, and to plant fleurs de lys all around the world."
52 Similar religious discourses underpinned Spanish conquest and expansion in Central and South America. European colonists' personal religiosity and faith became entangled in an all-encompassing struggle that provided powerful religious justifications for violence, and even holy war, in colonial warfare throughout the early modern Atlantic world. 48 Settlers in Atlantic colonies often already had intimate personal experience with religious violence. Many colonists were religious refugees fleeing what they considered to be repressive persecution in their former homes. Others were refugees from the chaos, political disruption, epidemic disease, and famine that accompanied the European religious wars. Some of these refugees came from areas of Germany, the Netherlands, France, or the British Isles where different religious groups coinhabited the same geographic space and were therefore accustomed to daily struggles over sacred sites during religious conflicts, lasting in some cases for decades. 53 Europeans coming from such conflict zones had frequently witnessed, or even participated in, "mimetic violence" that imitated the forms of judicial punishment in order to rid their communities of pollution and ritually cleanse the world.
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Captives and Ritualized Violence
Organized violence in the early modern Atlantic world often involved captive-taking and prolonged confinement or forced reidentification. 55 Captured soldiers and civilians alike might experience resettlement, cultural assimilation, forced labor, and violence. In order to understand ethnic and religious violence, we must consider the treatment of captives and the meanings of pain inflicted on human bodies through mutilation, torture, and other ritualized violence. 56 The early modern accounts of torture tended to sensationalize brutality and depict practitioners of ritual violence as inhuman or monstrous. While captivity is often presented as a solitary episode, early modern captivity narratives can be read to suggest that "suffering is a social experience," as Veena Das, Arthur Kleinman, and Margaret Lock have proposed.
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Ritual human sacrifice and cannibalism have often been seen as the ultimate atrocities, perpetuated by monstrous beings. In this issue, H. E. Martel offers a rereading of the most infamous case of cannibalism in the early modern Atlantic world, that of the Tupinamba of Brazil. While some scholars have questioned whether the Tupinamba actually practiced cannibalism, the ritualistic violence reported by several sixteenth-century European observers has continued to fascinate historians, anthropologists, and social theorists. 58 The supposedly cannibalistic Tupinamba served as a model for the contemporary Catholic cartographer André Thevet's cosmography, which has recently been reinterpreted by Frank Lestringant. represented devilish gorging to European travel writers who were attuned to issues of feast and famine and who believed that "God's greatest punishment with famine was to induce cannibalism, and especially to thereby induce starving mothers to eat their own babies."
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Europeans describing cannibals in this period of frequent famines and religious conflicts often wanted to emphasize their pious fasting and their "correct" interpretation of the Eucharist. Literary critic René Girard, instead of focusing on European descriptions, treats Tupinamba cannibalism as a "real" practice. Rather than seeing ritualistic cannibalism as an aberration, however, Girard suggests that it is merely another form of ritualistic sacrifice-a fundamental purifying act common to all religious systems and necessary to remove the pollution of violence, or "mimetic desire," from the community. 63 The very concepts of religion, violence, and ethnicity intersect in all of these readings of the Tupinamba.
Martel's interpretation, based on Hans Staden's captivity narrative, suggests that the Tupinamba probably were not cannibals but that they actively cultivated a cannibalistic image and successfully used the "subversive power of rumors in resisting imperialism." Hans Staden's religion-infused captivity narrative, intended for a Lutheran audience, provides the key source in this rereading of the Tupinamba's supposed cannibalism. In an interesting move, Martel's interpretation employs a Christian religious text to locate cannibalistic violence as an ethnic defensive smokescreen. Martel's findings parallel Gananath Obeyesekere's reading of Spanish descriptions of Aztec sacrifice and cannibalism, which concludes that "here is an excellent example of Aztecs manipulating a human sacrifice for political purposes, utilizing a conventional sign system to frighten the Spaniards, and no doubt succeeding." and mourning. 65 This issue becomes acute in the debate over the origin of the practice of scalping. Archaeological, linguistic, and textual evidence strongly suggest that scalping was practiced by pre-Columbian Native Americans, despite some previous claims that Europeans introduced scalping to Native American societies. However, European colonists clearly did encourage scalping and the mutilation of bodies in early modern colonial warfare through the use of bounties for scalps brought in by Native American warriors. 66 European religious leaders in North American colonies sometimes provided religious justifications for incidents of bodily mutilation and atrocities.
Europeans' captivity narratives can be compared with trial records of Native Americans who faced European judicial processes. Patricia Lopes Don's research on the Indian Inquisition in Mexico reveals the harsh punishments and executions meted out to Mesoamerican captives in an effort to halt what the inquisitors considered idolatry. Religious rationales sustained torture throughout European judicial systems and their colonial counterparts, not merely in Inquisition courts. A recent study of Catholic French torture finds that "much as chosen suffering sought to crush the rebellious will and thereby to make spiritual space for the indwelling truth of God, so too did judicial torture, by inflicting pain on an accused, seek to destroy the willfulness that diminished the truth of testimony." 67 European colonists subjected Native Americans to forms of judicial torture and execution that incorporated deliberate, ritualistic infliction of pain.
The most massive and systematic captive-taking operations in the Atlantic world arose in West Africa, as Europeans increasingly relied on African slave labor during the sixteenth century. Europeans' rising demands for African slaves in the seventeenth century seem to have fueled warfare among West African states and societies, encouraging slave-taking operations and supporting an "ideology of militarism [that] was founded in the political economy of the slave trade." 68 While European desires for slaves provided economic incentives for the slave mar-ket, the actual enslavement of Africans stemmed largely from wars conducted among African political entities. John Thornton has persuasively argued that "African participation in the slave trade was voluntary and under the control of African decision makers." 69 If European slave traders had to compete with internal African economic use of slaves, they controlled the transportation and reselling of slaves. The Middle Passage in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was a cruel, deadly voyage that killed more than 20 percent of captive Africans shipped across the Atlantic. 70 Slaves challenged the plantation complex through subtle collective action, revolt, and flight. Africans who escaped from plantations often formed maroon communities in the Caribbean and South America, but they always risked capture and reenslavement. The enormous scale of the early modern slave trade and the intense organization of the violence suffered by its captives should be contextualized by an examination of contemporaries' understanding of atrocities.
Mass Violence and Atrocity
Perhaps no single source had done more to shape our images of atrocity in the early modern Atlantic world than Bartolomé de Las Casas's famous account of atrocities in New Spain. 71 Travel narratives and polemical works written by Protestants built on critical Spanish accounts, such as Las Casas's, to fashion a "Black Legend" of Spanish cruelty in the mines and encomiendas of New Spain. Hans Staden's narrative probably criticized Portuguese slavery in order to please a Lutheran audience, and many of the facets of the Black Legend were undoubtedly a product of the religious propaganda of European wars of religion. 72 Yet, many of the atrocious episodes recounted in propaganda pieces did relate horribly real excessive violence practiced by Spanish colonial soldiers and settlers against noncombatants, as well as by other Europeans and Native Americans embroiled in conflicts in the colonial borderlands. Analyzing early modern atrocities is complicated not only by the outrage that accompanied most of these descriptions of atrocity, but also by ambiguous legal distinctions and gender conceptions that often made defining "noncombatants" very difficult. 73 Tracing the connections between religion and ethnicity can help in understanding the massive scale and disturbing character of the atrocities committed in the early modern Atlantic world.
The Virginia Massacre, as the Powhatan Confederacy's 1622 attack on English settlers in Jamestown colony is generally known, and the reprisal massacres perpetrated by English colonists reveal the dynamics of mass atrocities in this period. Melanie Perrault shows that during the decade before the massacre, deep contradictions emerged in English paternalistic attitudes that portrayed Native Americans as "noble savages" who lived in an Eden-like paradise. English colonial voyager Thomas Harriot thought that Native Americans would eventually come to "honor, obey, fear, and love us." Perrault reveals how such paternalistic attitudes created tensions in the Virginia colony and antagonized the settlers' Native American neighbors. When intercultural violence did occur, English political culture sanctioned extreme forms of violence against Native Americans as a justifiable means of upholding the colonial community and maintaining social order. 74 The increasingly brutal character of violence between English colonists and Native Americans highlights the failure of restraints in colonial warfare in the Atlantic world during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. All wars involve the forging of conventions between groups of combatants regarding the appropriate means and forms of violence; however, these conventional practices of warfare and restraints on violence are periodically violated and can at times break down.
Differing cultural expectations about violence and communication difficulties seem to have exacerbated problems in maintaining restraints on intercultural violence in areas such as Virginia and New England. Colonial military and militia units seem to have accepted the routine use of excessive violence, as the images of self-defense used by early seventeenth-century settler colonies incorporated notions of a "militarized frontier" and a "militia myth." 76 Europeans were increasingly accustomed to failures of restraints on warfare during the religious wars that engulfed vast areas of Europe from the mid-sixteenth century to the mid-seventeenth century. Cities in the conflict zones of the Dutch Revolt, the French Wars of Religion, the Thirty Years' War, and the English Civil Wars could suffer catastrophic violence as the most extreme applications of the "law of the siege" became normal. European soldiers, who were often ill-supplied and underpaid, became habituated to pillaging and burning towns that attempted to resist them. Massacres of inhabitants and executions of civic leaders followed the end of many sieges due to the brutal conditions of early modern European warfare and the excessive zeal of many soldiers participating in religious warfare. 77 Strong religious motivations often underlay the atrocities committed by the European combatants who fought in colonial wars. Mark Juergensmeyer argues that "warriors" in religious conflicts experience symbolic empowerment through their performance of violence in what they perceive as a "cosmic war." 78 This approach to religious conflict provides a way of interpreting early modern European soldiers' commitment to a cause and their willingness to inflict violence. For combatants in the European wars of religion, heretics and infidels both represented agents of the Devil, with shared abominable characteristics. Colonial encounters with indigenous peoples became sites of religious and theological dispute in confessional propaganda of the religious wars. If the Tupinamba could be compared to witches by the Protestant French writer Léry, so too could Huguenot "heretics" be portrayed as witches and sorcerers by Catholic polemicists in France. 79 For Christians anticipating the Apocalypse, waging warfare against the Ottomans in the Mediterranean or against the Powhatans in Virginia signified participating in the great struggle against the Antichrist. Many European soldiers and colonists who were directly involved in the production of violence in Europe's global expansion exported religious warfare into colonial contexts. 82 English, Irish, and Scottish soldiers who experienced the atrocities of the civil wars in the 1640s and 1650s may have been even more prepared to practice warfare beyond restraint. They had witnessed the erosion of conventional limits on warfare among Christians and the infusion of bitter religious hatred into European conflicts. 83 The atrocious nature of this sort of conflict arguably shaped later English attitudes toward both Irish and Native Americans. 84 The combination of ethnic stereotypes, imperial ideologies, and religious justifications not only sanctioned atrocities but gave them expansive meaning.
The Atlantic World and the Globalization of Violence
This issue highlights the advantages of examining the perpetrators of violence carefully as historical actors adopting multiple subject positions: violence's participant, manipulator, collaborator, witness, and even victim. The articles here are careful to explore the "gray zones" between oppressors and victims, and such an approach to the production of religious and ethnic violence offers new directions in the historiography of the Atlantic world that can complement studies of the "reception" of violence. 85 break down Eurocentric historiography by reconceptualizing Europeans' roles in the production of transatlantic and global violence, rather than by ignoring the European dimensions of early modern globalization. 87 After all, as Talal Asad argues, "Europe did not simply expand overseas; it made itself through that expansion." 88 The earliest and perhaps fullest combination of aggressive transoceanic imperialism, settler colonies, and racial slavery first developed in the Atlantic world in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Although the forms of ethnic and religious violence produced in this context were shaped by ongoing or contemporaneous imperial relationships in the Mediterranean, Indian Ocean, Eurasia, and Southeast Asia, the performances of violence in the Atlantic world arguably served as models for the globalization of violence throughout the early modern world.
Alfred W. Crosby's demarcation of a Columbian Exchange has provided a broad concept that continues to be useful, but we should remember that his depiction of the processes of transatlantic exchange emphasizes the violent, destructive clashes of conquering germs, plants, animals, and humans. 89 In contrast, the term "encounters," which seemed so dominant during the Columbian quincentennial, represents a problematic concept precisely because it obscures agency in the production of violence and deflects attention from the horrendous consequences of armed conflict. Moving beyond the notion of "encounters" requires inserting a comprehensive examination of violence into comparative histories and metanarratives of early modern globalization.
